Ukraine - The View from Poland, April Update

(Source)

Ewok Report, 2nd of April 2023

Since the Russo-Ukrainian war is already over year long, I will just set a timestamp of sorts instead of parts or other points discerning episodes. This time I will be short, because of personal/family life intruding. Instead, I will relate some very interesting analyses from Perun, who has risen to be my fave analyst:

1. The economic war:

Indicates state of the economic battle, which is where West is most openly involved, both as actor and as target.

TL;DR Version:

West has survived energy imports from Russia loss much better than expected, especially much better than Putin expected. In fact it is barely even on war footing. Russia survived that decoupling and sanctions also better than West expected. Ukraine survived everything Russia threw their way and didnt collapse into blackouts and cold. 

All in all, everyone can at the very least follow up for another year or more. 

2. Russian winter offensive:

TL;DR Version:

Costly, to both sides, but definitely more so to Russian one. And bringing some small gains in scenes reminding of WW1 trench nightmare. If/when Ukrainian spring counterattack comes, it can be very costly as well.

3. Attrition and Casualties:

TL;DR Version:

Trying to estimate attrition of equipment and casualties of troops Ukrainian claims are much more in line with visually confirmed wrecks, and considering dark numbers of not photographed wrecks they might be close to reality Meanwhile Russian claims sometimes are more than entire Ukrainian inventory of the item. Human casualties might be much harder to track.

4. The Air War:

TL;DR Version:

One of biggest surprises of the war was its air component. After initial chaos and Russian failed bid for air superiority, multitude of air defence systems have in fact enforced a Mutual Air Denial - a no-mans sky over the frontline where only few planes dare to operate in low altitudes, and at high casualty costs. 

What is very important, not even delivery of Western jets is likely to change the balance much.

My addition: very significant considerations resulting from this for Taiwan. Giving Taiwan porcupine-like array of air defenses might be better investment than costly fighters - even though they might have own uses in keeping enemy at bay.

Fighting Chinese over their own turf will be probably only feasible for stealth aircraft.

Chinese attempts at airmobile landings - be it heliborne or paratroopers - are likely to end in slaughter for them. 

Final words:

I expect Ukrainian offensive in the window from late April to early summer. There's tension between giving troops time to train, often with new western equipment, and giving Russians time to entrench.

As for where the hammer will fall, I am completely not ready to predict. In fact there is much likelihood that any speculations will be wrong, and part of effort to divert best Russian troops, as it was previously when Ukraine made a big show of wanting to retake Kherson, only to strike near Kharkiv. 

That's all, folks.

Paweł aka Ewok